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Unlike other participants in this symposium, I come to the topic of 
whether American government is broken, and whether the political  
system is facing a crisis of legitimacy, not as quantitative analyst of public 
opinion data, though I benefit greatly from that work.  I am a scholar of 
American political thought—as articulated chiefly by political and 
intellectual elites—and American political and constitutional development; 
and I’ve been asked to put current difficulties in historical perspective.  My 
response to “Is Government Broken?” starts by agreeing with many 
contemporary conservative commentators like Glenn Beck and Charles 
Kesler who trace modern political polarization and the recent declines in 
public approval of national political leaders, and to a lesser degree national 
institutions, back to Progressive era.1 That period saw the rise to new 
prominence of certain standards of legitimacy—especially democratic will and 
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1 Glenn Beck, for example, has made a series of videos pointing out Progressivism as the 
source of America’s decline. His website features articles by scholars such as Ronald J. 
Pestritto of Hillsdale College arguing similarly. See Ronald J. Pestritto, American 
Progressivism, GLENN BECK (April 16, 2009), http://www.glennbeck.com/content/artic 
les/article/198/23936/ [https://perma.cc/GM5X-6U6F] (discussing the historical background  
and political transformation of the Progressive movement).  Cf. Charles R. Kesler, Barack 
 Obama and the Crisis of Liberalism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://thf 
_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/fp45.pdf (discussing President Obama’s liberal political 
thought). 
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expert competence—that both expressed and reinforced new understandings 
of the Constitution and American political system.  Despite major differences 
over policy, including banking, tariffs and above all slavery, most 19th century 
American leaders agreed that Enlightenment doctrines of reason that 
ascertained permanent principles, such as natural rights, in tandem with 
broadly Christian morality, provided the fundamental standards for 
governmental legitimacy.2 Though in a republic the people should rule, most 
believed like Madison that it was the reason and not the will of the people 
that deserved to rule.3 And many felt that the Constitution should be 
venerated as an enduring embodiment of Enlightenment principles, perhaps 
even divine inspiration. 
But in the Progressive era, the intellectual, economic, and 
demographic changes of the late 19th century led many Americans to 
question 18th and 19th century notions of unchanging natural rights and of 
traditionalist understandings of Christianity. They drew from the idea of 
evolution the conviction that policies and institutions should change to 
meet changing needs, and so they placed great stress both on evolving 
democratic choices and purposes, and modern scientific understandings 
of how public policies could competently realize those purposes, as the 
basic standards of governmental legitimacy. Many were notoriously 
critical of the Constitution as an outmoded, inefficient, undemocratic 
system, including the only political scientist elected President, Woodrow 
Wilson.4 
Even so, Progressive attacks on 19th century understandings did not 
generate so strong a sense of the illegitimacy of American leaders and 
institutions then as now, in part because most Progressives continued to 
embrace broadly Christian standards of morality—even though this was now 
liberal social gospel morality, not fundamentalist Christianity—and many 
traditional forms of racial and gender orderings, hierarchies and roles in 
																																								 																				
2 For an overview of early American political thought, see Rogers M. Smith, Our Republican 
Example: The Significance of American Experiments in Government in the Twenty-First 
Century, 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 106-121 (2012), from which this lecture is partly 
derived.  See also JAMES W. CEASER, NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: A DEBATE (2006) (tracing “foundational ideas” and their use in historical 
public discourse). 
3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).  
4 See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (Houghton, Mifflin and Company 1901) (1885) (President Wilson’s doctoral 
dissertation on the inherent difficulties of the Constitution).  See also Smith, supra note 2, at 
112-119 (showing how scientific, theological, and economic developments during the 19th 
and 20th centuries contributed to the ideological polarization of the United States).  
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American society, which they claimed modern science endorsed.5 Many 
Progressive Democrats like Brandeis also believed in the states as 
laboratories of democracy in ways that made them comfortable with 
maintaining doctrines of states’ rights and federalism.6 So most Progressives 
were less socially and culturally radical than their doubts about the 
Constitution might suggest. 
But during the New Deal and the Great Society years, as Progressives 
revised their views into modern liberalism, most embraced strong national 
governmental programs with redistributive as well as regulatory goals—big 
government!—and they also embraced first egalitarian integrationist, then 
increasingly multiculturalist and feminist positions on race and gender issues, 
as well as ever more liberal theologies which often became forms of secular 
morality.7 Ironically, at the same time, as Aziz Rana has shown, by the mid-
20th century liberals had abandoned their attacks on the American 
Constitution and instead shared in its veneration, so long as it was understood 
as a “living Constitution,” to be interpreted according to evolving democratic 
values and modern scientific knowledge.8 
Despite its embrace of the Constitution, the liberalism that emerged in the 
third quarter of the 20th century was, even more than Progressivism, 
experienced by many Americans, especially older white Americans, as an 
assault on the cultural, racial, gender, religious, and economic systems and 
values that defined the America they believed in.9 They joined in building the 
coalition of economic conservatives, national security conservatives, racial 
conservatives, and religious conservatives that formed the Reagan coalition 
and brought about the Reagan Revolution in 1980 that dominated American 
politics in the last two decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st.10 This was also the time, as we know from analysts of congressional 
voting behavior and public opinion, when America underwent mounting 
political polarization, beginning in the late 1970s, and beginning first with 
the leadership of the two political parties, especially the Republicans who 
were moving right, though gradually American public opinion began to 
																																								 																				
5 See Smith, supra note 2, at 112-119. 
6 G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Managem-
ent, 31 PUBLIUS 37 (2001). 
7 ROGERS M. SMITH, POLITICAL PEOPLEHOOD: THE ROLES OF VALUES, INTERESTS, AND 
IDENTITIES 172-84 (2015). 
8 Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103 CAL. L. REV. 
335, 359-69 (2015). 
9 Rogers M. Smith, Identity Politics and the End of the Reagan Era, 1 POLITICS, GROUPS, 
AND IDENTITIES 120-27 (2013). 
10 Id. 
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become more polarized as well. The two parties became more sorted into 
opposed ideological camps, one conservative, one liberal, than had been true 
through much of previous American history.11 And what the history I have 
rehearsed suggests is that these camps and this polarization should be 
understood in part as a clash between liberal political world-views rooted in 
but going beyond the Progressive rejection of many 18th and 19th century 
conceptions of legitimacy, and valuing instead democracy, modern science, 
and a “living Constitution,” versus modern proponents of more traditionalist 
understandings, whose standards of legitimacy continue to embrace more 
conservative forms of religiosity, older doctrines of natural rights and natural 
law, and a Constitution interpreted in light of the original understandings of 
its ratifiers—a view of the Constitution strongly promoted by Reagan’s 
Attorney General Ed Meese and aimed, as the late Justice Scalia explained, 
at keeping the Constitution suitably dead.12   
The polarization between these two views has involved not just 
disagreements over policies and interests, real and important though those 
have been. Many adherents of each view regard their opponents as endorsing 
fundamentally invalid, illegitimate conceptions of the American 
constitutional system, its values and purposes. So they can be unyielding, 
especially conservatives, precisely because they regard their opponents not 
as a loyal opposition but as champions of illegitimacy. The results have 
included recurring threats of federal government shutdowns; paralysis on 
pressing issues such as immigration reform; and refusal even to consider 
President Obama’s nominee to replace Justice Antonin Scalia.13  
These examples show that modern partisan intransigency has risen to 
almost unprecedented heights, especially after Republicans gained control of 
Congress against Democratic President Barack Obama, beginning in 2010. 
Consequently, none of our governing institutions has performed as 
effectively as most Americans want, even as the Great Recession of 2008, 
which helped elect Barack Obama, has left many Americans, especially older 
and less educated Americans, struggling not to experience continuing losses 
																																								 																				
11 See generally MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: HOW LIBERALS BECAME 
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS (2009) (analyzing American 
partisan politics); NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY 
AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 2016) (same). 
12 For an overview of the various discussions concerning the interpretation of the Constit-
ution, see ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
13 AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL 
POLARIZATION 4 (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015).  See also Michael D. 
Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-courtnominee.html 
(discussing President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court). 
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in their economic and social statuses—what Anna Greenberg calls “the 
shrinking middle class.”14 
And so in 2016, we are seeing something new in regard to our topic. 
Precisely because American leaders and institutions have in many respects 
been paralyzed by modern political polarization and have failed to address 
many problems effectively, many Americans across the political spectrum 
are angry at the established leaders in both parties. They are flocking to 
outsider candidates, especially Trump and also Cruz in the Republican camp, 
and to a lesser degree, Bernie Sanders for the Democrats. Rather than 
choosing sides between the two polarized modern ideological camps, they 
are rejecting the legitimacy of modern American leadership and institutions 
still more radically—with Trump supporters drawn to a kind of authoritarian, 
strong-man nationalism that is not especially concerned about traditional 
constitutional limitations or standards, and Sanders supporters attracted to a 
“living constitution” that they wish to usher into a whole new stage of life, a 
democratic socialist stage. The upshot is that both because the camps defining 
modern polarization do not see each other as legitimate, and because many 
other Americans do not see the polarized, paralyzed government that these 
camps have created as legitimate, belief in the legitimacy of our leadership 
and institutions is, as my colleagues have shown, lower today than probably 
at any time in the last century. Or at least, that’s the cheerful view from my 
historical perspective. 
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University of Pennsylvania Law School, “Is Government Broken?” (Mar. 25, 2016). 
